Digital Commons @ George Fox University
David Rawson Collection on the Rwandan
Genocide

Archives and Museum

5-19-1991

The Genesis of the Rwandese Patriotic Front
United States Department of State

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/rawson_rwanda

••

RELEASED

-

AFRICA LEADERSHIP FORUM

PAGE(S) MISSING

KAMPALA FORUM ON CSSDCA
19 -

23 :MAY 1991

THE GENESIS OF
RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT
A Case Study of Roots of Insecurity
in an Independent African State

Submitted to the Committee on Security
.
. ~~

'

Rwandese Patriotic: Front
Department of Information
RUHENGERI
18'~ :\lAY 1991

United states Department of state
Office of FOI, Privacy, & Classification Review
Review Authority: HOLMES, EDWARD.
Date: 01/W./f!l
Case ID: 95003933

..
2.

intermarriages and constant social and economic interractions.
Banyarwanda evolved commcn cultur~, they believed in one
traditional religion and they shared national aspirations.
! .•
.
.
Accordingly, Banyarwanda lived together in harmony, in each
0

and every village all over

th~

..

ccuntry.

The term Batutsi, Sahutu and Batwa in their original
connotation refer to social stratificatio~ which was based
on differer.ct economic activities ~nd individual fortunes.
Until the advent of the white colonial rule, Banyarwanda
managed tbeir society in a clear si~ple but effective manner.
Administration wa~ h!aded by a hereditary monarch wto, by
ccstom did net claim ownership of.any property. Below theKing were county chiefs, subcocnty chiefs, army commanders,
land chiefs (for agriculture) and ·pasture chiefs (for livestock). Appointment5 to these positions w£re open to all
Bar.}a~~anda irrespective of birth.
This group represented
the high cla~.~ in scciety known as Batutsi.
Below this ~13$~ were the larger mass~s of a~ri
culturist pea~ants. The ma~ority of ~his ~iass pra~ticed
mixed farmin!· They o~nec few animals, mainly ccws. goats
end sheep at the same time tilled=the land for food. In this
group w~re ~ec~le of specialized skills such as tannery,
makina clothing out of hides and skin:, builder!, blacks~iths
who ma~e such useful tools as hees, knive!, srears, arrow
heads, eopperwire, etc. This class was ccMmonly known as
-~:i Bahutu.

The third

grc~p

were the artisans. whc were

class alsc ~reduced enter~ainers and
commonly known a~ Patw~.
It must be
I

interde~endent.

E~phasised

Thev

~ach

~usic

s~illed

c:~~:s•r~.

I~

in
was

that these three cla~~es were
~eeded the s~rvi~es ~f ~~e c~her
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In the first instance the colonial admini~trators
recognised the existence of county and sub-county chiefs and
rejected the existence of land and pasture chiefs and yet
...-.these ·proVided tsystell or checks an<l balances in the
management of society. The monarch was stripped of all the
traditional powers and reduced to mere ceremonial status so
that the entire administration rested in the hands of the
Belgian administrators.

Secondly, the normal social free mobility up and down
the social status ladder was blocked. Those whom the
colonialists found in position as chiefs were either reconfirmed in their jobs or replaced by their sons. On the
other h~nd those who were found in the lower class had no more
avenues through which to move up the social status ladder.
The lucky few who were found in the relatively higher class
were offered whatever little education there was and they had
job opportunities. People who were found on the lowe~ seal~.
the general masses, wer~ denied educa:i~n and had ther~fore
no job opportunities. This created sharp class differences as
year~ went by.
Thirdly a new but antagonistic economic order was
introduced. The traditional manufacturing sector was harshly
discouraged and uprooted. Imported substitutes flooded the
market. Imported hoes, saucepans, clothes, salt, knives,
etc. replaced those made locally. As a result, the whole
class of inventers and skilled entrepreneurs was reduced to
poverty and misery.

in~tit~ted

in

~~e

::antry.

~en

and

~~rnen ~er!

fcrced to

~ork

long hours cultivatin~ such ~a$h crops as coffee. an~ bu:~

wheat. These crops took up the best and fert1le lands ~nd
the people had little time to grow food. Periodic devastating famines ensued. :onstructi~n of read~ and hi~hways .
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In 1959, soon after the mysterious death or King Mutara
Rudahigwa, in Bujumbura, a number of political parties were
launched .in prepara.tion for J.f~.tf.~~dence. Theae wer.!~~,?-on•.
Rationale Rwandese(UNAR) which called for national unity and
cherished the continuation of a constitutional monareh;
Association pour la promoti~n sociale de la masse, (APRGSOMA)
whose objectives were to get rid or both the colonial rule
and remains of feudalism and thereby to emancipate the masses
of all Banyarwanda; and (PARKEHUTU) parte de movement pour 1'
emancipation Hutu" whose objective was to promote Bahutu and
declare themselves emancipated froa the Batutsi aristocra~y
and establish domination of Bahutu over other classes in the
country. This party, interestingly, had no quarrel with the
colonial administration. the colonial power in their turn,
gave their undivided support to PARMEHUTU and they put all
their weight and repression against all the other political
parties.
Towards the ~nd of 1959 when open fighting begun bet~een
supporters of the ~wo main parties UNAR and PARMEHUTU , ~he
Belgian administration morally and physically ~upported
PARM£HUTU. Bands of young Bahutu were organised by Belgian
paracommandoes, given matches and led to village~ with orders
to kill Batutsi and burn their huts. Very many people died
and thousands had to run into exile. This act of atrocity,
masterminded and enforced by the colonial government still in
authority, sowed dengerous seeds in the country. A aulture
..~t violence·and political murders was introduced and it was
institutionalised by Kayibanda and Rabyari111ana regimes since
no arsonist or murderer were charged in ~our,:s of law even
~
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a "moral revoluticn". However, lik~ the "social revoluti~n
of his predecessor the regime was characterised by bloodshed and consolidation of group divisions. Soon afte~ the
coup nearly all,the ex-ministers includiag Kayibanda hi•self
were arrested and killed in cold blood.
During all this period Habyarimana has followed policies
which are similar to the apartheid of South Africa. Under
the system known as "eguilibre ethnique et regional", every
"ethinic" group is assigned water-tight quotas in national
opportunity based on annually computed population census which
cover education, business and job opportunities.
Habyarimana also introduced the use of pass-book or
identity cards which classify a person on the basis of his
ethnicity or caste. This book is used to segregate people
within one country and to make them appear strangers to one
another. The principle of separate development has been
·consolidated and expan~ed to interfere with indivi1ual social
matters including ~arriage.
In order for Muhutu to g~t.a ~ob
in the government or ~o be promoted in the sr~y he ~u~t ~c~
have ~ Mututsi wi~e. A~y c~e whc has dane so s~f~e~s !~~~~e
discrimination. Habyarimana himself is known to have prevented
his own daughter from marrying a son or the Rwanda Ambassador
to Italy simply because the boy was a Mututsi. Under the
circumstances human rights abuses are ~ndemic. Innocent person!
are often arrested and either eliminated or kept in prison for
years without trial.
Apartheid Philosophy:
The

.. - .. ·....
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~

........
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issue of 10, December 1990.

The paper is owned by Col.

Private Secretary to·the President.

In this paper the
.•• i 9
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The education sector (pupils, students teachers) mus:
be majority Hutu.

7.

The Rwande~e Armed forces must be exclusively Hutu.
The experience or October war has taught us a lesson.
No military person should marry a Mututsi woman.

8.

The Bahutu should stop having mercy on the Batutsi.

9.

The Bahutu, wherever they are, must have unity solidarity
and be pre-occupied by the fate of their Hutu brothers.
The Bahutu both inside and outside Rwanda ~ust con~tar.tly
look for friends ar.d allies for the Hutu cause, starting
with our Bantu brothers.
They must constantly counteract the Tutsi
propaganda.
The Bahutu must be fir~ and vigilant against their
common enemy who is Batutsi.

10.

The 1959 social revolution, the 1961 referandum and t~e
Hutu ideology must ~e taught to every Muhutu and at
all levels. E~er7 Huhutu must ~pr~ad widely thl~
ideology. ~e shall consider a trai~cr any M~hu~u
who will persecute his Huhutu brother for having read.
spread and taught this ideology.

These are the principles •hieh underly the thinking
and actions or Habyarimana and his government in Kigali. They
fall within the circle of the white supremacists in ~he
Apartheid of South Africa. It is not suprising therefore to
realise that since his ascendence to power he has propagated
:~·::t:ir.::...a~:..:-:

~~~

~·~:~;c--::.::t::

!"'~g!~~~!.

-!{·::. ..·:::~.~.

::: :::-:·

today there is no ream for dissent. Any ' ~lfn or ~us~~ci:~3
of sympathy to o~positi~n leads cne to ~~~~~~ which ~~ten
ends in death •.
. .. I 1 ,
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To bring about and cement national unity

·.

~~

.

To institute genuine democracy right from grassroots to the legislative level.
To promote intergrated and self sustaining economy.
To eradicate corruption in all its torms.
To guarantee security of person~ and property.
To provide a permanent solution to the refugee
problem.
To promote social welfare for the benefit of all
the citizens.
To promote peace and cooperation between our
neighbours and all ~he ~eace lovin; nations of the
world.
Rwandese F3triotic Front has the confidence that these
objectives ~ill be achieved. D~~ailed strategies on how each
of these objectives will be achieved are well stated in the
Manifesto of the Front.

• ••• 1..13
~1.

111 ••

Cn the 15th Fe~. 1991. Pr~s:~ent Habyari~ana called upon all
the refugeee to return home. He promised them appropriate
reception and proper r~settlement. There is ~vidence that he
made this statement as a propaganda gimic. He had not drawn
up any plans for the ~ven:. It is known that for the past 17
years he insisted that Rwanda was already over populated and
that there was no room left for resettlement of repartriated
refugees. President Habyarimana has celebrated the total defea
of RPF on many occasions but the Front is growing from strength
to strength poised for eventual victory. More significantly,
the Rwanda Government has declared that it is preparing for
multiparty elections. This is stated at the time when the
hot war is continuing. It is hard to believe that rree and
fair democratic process can be organised in the country which
is raked with instability. Moreover, while the Government is
pronnouncing guidelin~s for multiparty el9ctions, the
political ~arty in powe~ is openly preaching sectarianism and
spr~3ding malicious ru~cur ~~~t RPF plans ~o extermin~te all
the Eahutu in the coun~ry. This is a clear indicatio~ :ha~
ccndu~ting election under ~hese ccnditicns would throw·the
~=u~:ry once agai~ into another wave c~ t:acdshed.
Partriotic Front, on their part, believe that
genuine peace can only ~e achieved in Rwanda if the follo~ing
steps are taken:
R~andese

1.

Total end or war activities and other
hostilities by both parties;

z.

F~nnounc:ati~~.

~n

the part cf toe Rwanda

15/ •••••

'.
16 ••

RPF feels that for President Habyarimana an6 his
clique to continue u~holding the principles akin to Nazism
or Germ'any during World War I an(f.II in F'WANDA undermines
th~ moral obligation of the entire African leaderships tc
oppcse the apartheid of South Africa.
Acccrdingly, all m~n of goodwill are called upcc to
assist RPF in finding ways and means to rescue Rwanda fro~
the present fascist regime. RFF is convinced that Civil.
Strifes and blocdshe~ wtich have characterised Rwanda for ~he
past 32 years muet come tc ar. er.d. Peace, reconciliation and
natior.al ULity are the overriding objective~ ~tich FPF i~
d£termined to achieve.

~.

NWANU COJDIUNIQUE
1. At d.c i1Ma1ioe ol r.uicbc Ali HloSSaa NWINYI of the Uaited ReJ)'Ibic ol
Tuzai&, die Prcsideat olt!K Republic o(Up.oda, H.E. Yoweri K.apta MUSEVENU
aod the PJUidee.l of lhe Republic of Rwnd.a, H.'E. Major Gncral Jul'I:D&i
HABYAJUMAHA. met iD Mwaa.za ill Tuzuia. oc 17dl October, 1990.
2. TJac chrec Pruidcats ciaaaucd the cuneDt ansted COGllia iD Rwuda ud qrccd to
rc:aoM tbc problem bypeac:dW mcus. They also took IIOtc ol the politil'l; ltcpc ~

takcA by the G<Mnamcal ollhe RepubUt; ol RW&Ada to opca up the poli.tica1 systca iD
R.QDda. W'dh reprd to this coo.llict lht Gcwmulleat of the Repubalic of Rwuda
GDdmook to il1itia!c • dialogue with boc.la the iDtmW ud cxtua.a1 oppoWoc. I&Ddu
the nspicca ollbc Sec:rctary-GCDmJ ollbe Orpnintioo of Afric::aa UAicy.

3. FoUowitlg 11p011 this IIOieam dcdaratioa by the PtaidcAt ol tbc Repablic olltwuda,
the~ olthc UWd llepubGc ol T~ ud ollhe ~ ol UpM&
UDdatook to·pcmw~e ahe anacd oppo5itioa ill Rwuda to ob5et¥C a ceuc('!ft. 1k
cc.uefue shollld be m<laitored by aeutral troopc mutuaUy agreed upoa by the putie&
c:aacerned. FollowiD« upon the cu.sefirc, a iqioul coafcreau to be alluded by aD
the parties afrcc:tcd by the quatiou of refugees 'llo'OUid be coaveK.d to~ the refugee
problems ill the rcgioa, ma comprcher:u.ive I!WlDa:
.C. The Presidents of the Republic of RwaJUb and of the Republic of Uguda expressed

their profound gratitude to President Ali H&SWl MV.-1NYI of the Uaited RcpubUc: oC
Tanzania for the hospitality extended to them cluri.ag their short vWi. The three
Presidents agreed to ~eet at a date to be fixed in the future.

Dooc at Mwanz.a on 17th Odober, 1990.
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GBADOLITE COMMUNIQUE
A! lk ~ ol ManiWJ MotMdu Sese Scto Kab NpbeUa Wa %thup
Prcsidcol ollhc RcpabiKolz.irc. PraidcmJcvcaal H~ olRwacla. Yowcri
Muncci ol Uguda ud Picm a.,ota olBun&Adi mcc at Gbaclolice 011 Friclq 26
October. 1990. Hi& Em:Ueacy Presicbt Buyoya. Cl&ti'CIIl awr... aC&IIc CEl'GI,.
Wormed Praickol MUSCYCoi ollhc outc:a1DC aC &be cli.fc:aaiorw lldcl ia Gblcloliae • 23
ud 24 Odobu, 1990. PraidcDI Museveai idly supported die c:oodulioN ol daat
·Summi1 011 tbc problem iD R W&Dda. T1ae lour Heads ol SWc raf6nlcd dicit' aJallllit.
IDC1)( to tbc Mwuza Commuaiquc Maid~ cxwtitutc& a IOUIId basil Cor IJie Rcsolutioa cl
tbc coaflict iJl Rwuda.. Ia tu eoalclll, tbc rour Hcack ol Slate -srccd oa die lolowiac

...

•

measure.:
1. Oo lbc ccucfire. abe Heads ar SCale acrced oa lk *CCI to lane - Afric:u
pcace·kcepiDg fOfCIC aad to that dcct tlley awadate.cl ~ coDcapc Pl'lllidcat
M~ Ill Upada. ill IIi& capacity 11 OlrrCIIt Oaainaaa oldie OAU. CO make die
acc:caaty couuJtatioas with a view to h'limc dU& farc:e ill place.
~ a.a. iauDcdatc mcasve, they agreed oa u obscnu tummmpoiCd oilS llliSUry •
officen cadi &om Upada. Zaire and BurwKii. This team shaD alio be jomcct by up co
5 Reprcsc:utatiw:s &om the Goven~IKDi ofRW&Dda aDd from tbc armed oppoticM
The obsenter team shall work UDder the supenisioa of the Sec:rctary-Gcaeal ot the
OAU and shall assemble ia Goma. Zaire 0C1 29 October 1990. &dl party shall prcMdc
logistical aDd fmaac;ial support co its compoocut of lhe team.

2.

Cooeeming dialopc. tbc Heads of Stale mudated lhU coDcape. Praideac
Mobutu of Zaire, to act as AD intermediary bctweea the two bcDigereau. ID thai rqard.
he_sh.all keep the OAU Scaetuy.(icneral rcgularly-iuCOI'lllCd of &be prosrca made.

3.

4. W11b respect to &he queltion of refugees, die Heads of'Stacc aac::e aPia rcd"lfiiiCd
that the dialogue should culnWwc ill a rcgjoaaJ coDfereDC~e to W a tiDaludlaslizl«
solutioa to the quesaioa or rdugca. 'The PresideDrs ol Rwuda. Up!lda ud Ba:ruadi
expressed their deep tpprcc:iatioa to Presideat Mobutu ad lhc People or Zaire I« 1bc
v.-arm v.~lcomc acc:orded lo lhem ADd their ddcp~.

Douc at Gbadolitc ODthe 26th October, 1990.
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1. Prcsiclcat Ja¥Caal HABYAIUMANA of Rwaad.a ud Prcsiclat Yowcri
MUSEVENI olUpllda met ill Zanziw ao 171la fcbruuy,1991 udu dw: ausptc:a ol
Praidc&t Ali IWwa Jdwiayi ol the Uaitcd RqtubiK oiTauuia.

l
j

2. ~IDUtitlg'IIIUI follow-sap ol &he lul Summitaediqladdbctwcea tktwobden

-aa OwUb border J'CI'l. R.wud.&. oo 20tJI N~.1990.

3.Tbe CWO lfeack ol S&ak JeYicwcd propaa made ill their dl'ort& to fiD4 a peaceh&l
&olutioa to t.bc COAllict ~ R.wud.a.

1
f

i

l'

I
I

•· The two He&4koCSUtcrcaewcd 1heircommM.......,,'DDCkrt.he Mwuza Coirmmniquc
rcr the ~ olu immediate celldire. Cor • dialopc widt tile iateru1 ucl
CJlerUl oppc.aitioe ud for che IIOidiGg o( a Jtq;oaal Coa!cm~C~C oa tk probCa ol
R.wudcse ~ Ia diU rcprd:

(a) Tbe Preside at ol tile R.cpubUc oC Rwuda rcacwe4 the R.waada ~~

b-._
~

o«u to ob5cne ID immediate cusefue starting 011 1&11 february, 1991 at 10.00 J.oura
or earlier as mutully agreed upon bctwu&llhe coaceracd parties.
(b) The f'rC$ideal oC the Republic of Uganda undertook to~ che armed
opposition to reciprocate ud obsaYe a c:casefue SUrtiugoa18th Februaly, 1991 at 10.00
hours or earlier as Dn&t!Wiy agreed upon bctwccD lhc CODGCrocd parties.

(c) The two Presidents undertook to ..:c;der.ate the process of dialQiUC as
stipulated in the MY.-anza and Gbadolitc Commwliquc.
(d) The tv.-o Heads of State also aprCS$cd their sacisfactiou \lrlth 1be progress oC
the Regional Couferea<X oa R~ Refugees ud expressed the bopc we \be
forthcoming Rcgi~Summit oo Rwanda Refugees to be held ill Dar a SaWm oa 19lh
Fcbruaty,l991, v.'OUid go alOng way lov.'Ud.s fmding a globaJ aDd luting solutioa to tbc
problem oa R.""udcse Refugees.

S. The two Presidents committed tbemselva to raton: harmony, bcotbabood ud JOOd
11cighbourliuess bctwcenlhc (W() COWlf.ries cspccWly a!oag lheir border.
6. President H.abyarim.ana aDd Muscvcni, lhWcd their ho5t Prc:sickm Mwieyi of
_TaDUilia Cot the ..,.ann and generous hospiulity accorded to them.

Done at :z..anzibM OD 17th february. 1991.

.
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.DAADSAI.MJI~.RA710NON RWANIJ£S£ltU'UGEES,ROBlDI

L .u-...wwaoeCIIHE.M ......IIWIN'fl;l'nlidalollkU.aclRcpub5c
a(T-a.6eit B ~r"n:iaPreDdclalllmiUYOYAotdle-RcpublicoCBiradi,
J....a JWUYAaiiiAHA. aldie it•adac ~ Y....tl( MUSEVENI oldie
Jl ......olUtJMa...SiallaiiJWW.PriiKMiDilt.cra(dw: RepublkGIZUre.,.act
~an..u.u.,VM•atpllb1icorr---..tt,.._,l9PP. AlloU.anracSncr:
...:RJI.E.Dr.$AI.a.ABMEDSAUM.~oltJ.eOAU.uc1Mr.Sap.
"'-*MIIe.~mdlcUaiteciNU.HiPCcn•-••·oeetrorR.efupe&.

2..

ConficJaial die loa& lltaa&q traciaiOAl ad ~tie& chal
.tePa. c:o.raaa

*

amoaast die

oe

WU~~~~aa
pc:op~a oltt.
die
udcrtiacd the spirit sood
~U...IOiiclarilyudbnOair~daalJaave always~Cn'CC!ISI basis

I«~- raoMaccoenDM Jll1lblc-.

,,
JP

3. Hawiaclacudlk...eport~ cldatHcadaclSUtecoe.ccraed ud lhcSeactuy-Gacnl
of dae OAU oa ck illlplcacatioa oC lhe ~ caka at tbe ·NWANZA.
GBADOUI'E ud GOMA SIIJD!Diasreptdiae abc initiatioa oCa dialcpc betwcal the
parties to the coallict.lbc atablisbmeaa ol a cusdirc aad the dep1oymasl: oCthe Military
Ot.cncr Twa to be foiJowcd by tbc Jtcpoul Coal'cte~ the five Hack al SC*
revicwtd the sic1lllioa prcYiiliag iD Rwuda • a result oC the C\ats that bcpD ia
OctGbet 1990 ud, ia particular, the problem oCRWU!dae refugees iD tbc rqjou.
4. Tbc Coalc:rcocc cxpcuea ils thanks ud apprcciaUoO to H.E. Marshal MOBtm1
SESE SEKO, PraidcAt of the Republic of Zaire. fer his efforts iD Uwitutillg a dialogue
bctwcca the R.'ftUdc.se 00YmDDc1lC aDd the Armed Oppositioa aad also took DOte of
tbc climaa!Des. that baYC beea cDCOUDUred ia tu mpect. The Confcrcace, laowevcr,
wacaPraidaalMobututom•intlinthciDOaiCIIf.w:aofthcdiaJocuesolhattbcb.tcerc&D
fiAd a tolutioa ID lhc problem faciDg lhc parties c:caccnaed.

5. FuDy aware tbat tlae fale or the Rwucksc refugees illhc respoasibility or lhc pcop~
oCJlwucia ud its GoYCnamclll, 1hc ~"Cl"'UIWK oCRwanda reiterated it.s eommitmcDt
aofiading a cScWM ucl durable sohllioa to this problem. ID tbis respca.lhc CiovcrJI..
meat ciRwuda:
a) recopizca tbat wolwwy rcpalriadoo ~ alqitiasatc ri.ghtol' R.,-azu!esc rcfqecs
ud CCIGS(itutes a factor for peace ud aatioaal recoaciliatioa;

or

b) Ulldtrulc:s. ..~hill the spirit ofics policy political opcaiug towardull political
poupiDp. 10 re!IIO\o-e Ill obstacles 'ltilich impede the returD of Rwudesc rcfugeci to
lhcir coua~- and to paraatcc their (uti panicjpatioo iD the dcmocrllk political process
.r lbe country~
0

·-

ls ready 10 tilt appropriate stcp5 lO facilitate lhc hannoaious ICIW'1t Ucf
rcilltcgrat~ in all sectors ol utionalJif'c: of refugees •ilo •'OUid ha~ cxpres£Cd the ~r~Ub
c)

lo do so and to declare a comprchensn-e general I.Dltlest)· for re{ugccs as de(&DCd &)·the

J95ll"S C"n\"Cfttioa md the t%0 OAt: Cclft\-cntion on Refugees;

w

or

dl .~ees. on
cnnclm:ioa 1he: ccascfirc agreement and •.posili\<t e-nd to the
dial~c. to:' C'<tCnd the ~::ncraJ amncst~ l•l mc:JuJ4: rc'f"'M \l.bO Ina~· ha"e a~tnmictcd
a~s apin.,~

the State rrk'1f ,,, their dc.-r:ut ur~ or durin~ tt:dr 1-tay ouuidl:' the c''uftt~·.
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